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Chapter 6

RESISTANCE TO ENEMY INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION

6-1. (U) Introduction:

a. *General.* A detailed analysis of prisoner handling by various powers discloses a pattern that has been reduced to three specific processes. Communist methods are considered typical and are used for purposes of illustration.

(1) *Interrogation.* The extraction of information from an individual that can be used to serve the cause of the communist society. This information can be, and often is, military in nature, but it is not limited to items of prime military significance.

(2) *Indoctrination.* The process of re-educating the prisoner in the communist doctrine and political position in relation to current events, with intent to convince him, through "logical reasoning," that his own country's cause is not in the "peoples" best interests. The potential in this area is nearly unbounded. On the one hand, it can be conversion of a man's belief, in which he is led to aspire to the communist cause; or to a lesser degree, it can so confuse the prisoner about his previously held beliefs that he will willingly or unwillingly become the servant of the communists.

(3) *Exploitation.* The use of the prisoner and his captive status, as well as the results of interrogation and indoctrination, for such purposes as labor, propaganda, hostage value, and subversion.

b. *Prisoner's Obligation.* A prisoner is obligated to resist the efforts of his captor to capitalize on these processes. This obligation springs from a number of sources. They include the traditions of his Military Service, his oath to his country, and the clearly stated obligation in the Code of Conduct. It shall be the military purpose of the prisoner to continue the fight

and to recognize that only the terms of combat have been changed. The battle must be fought with all the courage and devotion that the man can muster, and his determination and obligation to win the fight must not be diluted.

6-2. (U) General Purposes of Communist Processes:

a. Military personnel who are unfortunate enough to become captives of an enemy, despite their best efforts to remain free, can realistically expect to experience all three processes as an integral part of their captivity. Documented records fail to disclose any individual case where such processes were not attempted. The procedure given priority, and the degree to which the processes are applied, will vary with the particular situation and the needs of the communist captor at the time. A factor in an enemy's determination to apply coercive pressure is any weakness discovered in the physical or emotional makeup of the prisoner.

b. Several factors will determine how intensely the processes are applied; for example, the prisoner's rank and military function. Experience shows that communist states consider that successful exploitation of a prisoner of higher rank increases the acceptability and plausibility of the product. They are also prone to feel that an exploitation project that could undermine the US will to conduct or continue to apply a military program that has been particularly effective is worth almost any effort.

6-3. (U) *Communist Techniques.* Communists have demonstrated numerous techniques in attempting to achieve interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation. These techniques vary

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from subtle forms of psychological pressure to more obvious forms of outright torture. Isolation is a frequently used technique, with elements of physical and mental duress. It may be in physically cramping quarters, constant darkness or light, without visual or oral communication with others (including guards). The result is boredom, monotony, and mental and physical fatigue. Other techniques such as the threat of execution, use of drugs or hypnosis, and beatings, and how to counter them are covered elsewhere in this manual and in Military Service and command publications.

6-4. (U) Resistance to Interrogation:

a. *The Prisoner's Responsibility:*

(1) The captor can be expected to mount a continuing program to elicit information from the prisoner. This program may be conducted overtly or covertly, and the areas of interest have virtually no boundaries. Prisoners of higher rank, and those who are responsible for sophisticated weapon systems, will be subjected to the more intense efforts. However, all personnel may properly assume that they have some information that will be useful to the enemy. At the very least, the information they possess can be used against them in the exploitation process described below.

(2) The Code of Conduct, DOD Directive 1300.7, 8 July 1964, and Military Service directives specify the area of response to an interrogator and clearly state the prisoner's responsibility in this regard. All prisoners must confine their answers to the prescribed limits. The approved responses are based on comprehensive study of the experiences of US military personnel held captive by hostile powers and are designed to:

(a) Deny military information to the enemy.

(b) Protect the prisoner from the application of pressures based on information that the prisoner has furnished.

(c) Protect the prisoner group as a whole by restricting any insight that the enemy

may be able to acquire about one prisoner based on data procured from another prisoner.

(d) Protect the basic interests of the United States in conducting military and political operations to counter enemy attempts at domination.

(3) In the situation outlined in a(1) above, the means of carrying out the obligation is basically the same. Every prisoner must withhold the information that he possesses by limiting his responses to those cited in the Code of Conduct and the pertinent Military Service directives. It should also be made clear that the prisoner is authorized to discuss matters of personal health with his captor. (However, see Paragraphs 6-4d and 7-4.)

(4) The prisoner must be aware that the enemy interrogator very well may have extensive biographical data on him. The fact that the enemy has the information does not release the prisoner from his obligation to comply with the Code of Conduct.

b. *Guidance Provided by the Military Services.* Each of the Military Services has published guidance pertaining to the techniques of interrogation practiced by communist bloc countries. These techniques and the purpose behind them do not vary significantly from one country to the next. Similarly, all Military Services outline standards of personal conduct best suited to discourage continued interrogation. Each Military Service is responsible for training its personnel according to their needs and the capture potential of the individual. The Military Services are further responsible for dissemination of approved responses within the guidelines prescribed by Paragraph 6-4a. (See also Paragraph 2-4e.)

c. *Effectiveness of Drugs and Hypnosis.* The search for effective aids to interrogation is as old as man's need to obtain information from an uncooperative source. The notion that drugs or hypnosis can illuminate hidden recesses of the mind, help to heal the mentally ill, and prevent or reverse miscarriages of justice has been exploited in the press and popular litera-

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ture. The result is a highly embellished picture of what these methods can do. Actually, there is no documented history of communist captors using either drugs or hypnosis on US military personnel. However, because of the abundant reference to these methods available to military personnel, a clarification of the subject is deemed advisable.

(1) Used on uninformed and anxious prisoners, drugs or hypnosis could prove to be an *aid* to interrogation, but nothing more. If the prisoner is aware of the limitations inherent in their application, both techniques may be considered ineffective. Their effectiveness is often the result of the prisoner's attitude. A prisoner who has lived under stress conditions for some time, and who is faced with the threat of drugs or hypnosis, or who encounters an environment where their use is suspected, may tend to be influenced by the situation and resign himself to some form of automatic compliance.

(2) The threat of drugs or hypnosis can of itself be somewhat effective in raising the threshold of suggestibility. The actual administration or application of valid or pseudo-narcotic or hypnotic stimuli may increase the suggestibility level still further for an unprepared individual. It is also important to note that the subject emerges from drugs or hypnosis (real or imagined) with the feeling that he has revealed a great deal, even when he has not. A well-managed interrogation program might well allude to such guilt feelings to capitalize on any success that is experienced.

(3) It is also manifestly true that successful hypnosis depends on a positive relationship with the hypnotist, and this relationship is alien to the interrogation environment.

(4) In summary, drugs and hypnosis are ineffectual for interrogation purposes when the subject is strongly inclined to maintain emotional control. Any individual who can withstand the rigors and stress of classic (and competently conducted) interrogation in a state free of drugs or hypnosis can do so in the state

induced by such exotic measures. The essential resources for resistance are deep seated, and strong beliefs or positions will not be altered by these methods.

d. *Limiting Responses to the Enemy.* While the prisoner cannot require the enemy to stop their interrogation, his limited responses will make clear that their continued concentrated efforts will be futile. The limiting of communication with the interrogator should also extend to personal information, as this will deprive the enemy of data for the exploitation process.

e. *Benefits of Resisting.* The restriction in DOD Directive 1300.7, which states that further responses are made on the prisoner's own responsibility, is based on two considerations:

(1) To protect the interests of the United States, and

(2) To reduce the amount of data that the enemy might be able to compile on any prisoner. If each prisoner acts to further the second consideration—which is to his own advantage—he will automatically further the first one.

6-5. (U) Resistance to Indoctrination:

a. Indoctrination is one of the communist techniques of waging war. It consists of half-truths, calculated lies, and appeals to reason, all devised to best serve the cause of the indoctrinator. Its purpose is to make the prisoner doubt the soundness of his country's cause. The prisoner must understand this. It will make it much easier for him to ignore any appeal the indoctrination may have.

b. The prisoner cannot hope to stop the indoctrination by any direct action of his own. He can, however, contribute directly to its failure by refusing to be drawn into debates with the indoctrinator, and by refusing to admit that he has participated in operations that are in any way spurious or suspect. He should also reiterate his unswerving faith in his own cause. Such avowals have a twofold impact: they discourage any impression that he is uncertain of his cause or that his beliefs can be modified. They also tend to reinforce the pris-

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oner's personal resistance, so that he can readily meet his obligation—which is to remain stable and continue the fight.

c. Above all, the prisoner must understand that the indoctrinator's goals are alien to his own, regardless of the attempt to make them sound similar. Communist ideology and the American way of life are completely dissimilar, and, in many ways, incompatible.

6-6. (U) Resistance to Exploitation:

a. *Purpose of Exploitation.* The purpose of exploitation is to derive some value from the prisoner. When used by a skillful captor, it may be difficult to recognize and resist, but the prisoner must make every effort to do so.

b. *Prisoner of More Value Alive Than Dead.* Being of potential value to the enemy can be advantageous to the prisoner since his captor is less likely to use severe measures. Every prisoner should realize that he is of more potential value to the enemy alive than dead.

c. *The Chief Value of a Prisoner.* The values of military prisoners are summarized as follows:

(1) *Value as a Source of Military Information.* Interrogation for military information, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is perhaps the most obvious component of the exploitation process. Most personnel have been aware for most of their lives that it is the practice of the captor to interrogate prisoners and the duty of the prisoner to deny disclosures. How well this duty is carried out depends on the individual determination of each prisoner.

(2) *Value as a Labor Force.* Prisoners have been called upon to work during captivity and would doubtless be required to in the future. To date, however, exploitation in the form of labor has not been significant.

(3) *Value as a Hostage.* The broadest definition of the term "hostage" applies in assessing a prisoner's value as a hostage. It is undeniable that communist nations are aware of the extreme importance the US attaches to its military personnel who are being held against their will. They realize that the United States exerts maximum effort at all times and under all con-

ditions to regain its people. Concessions to effect their release have been granted in the past and may be granted in the future. Knowing this, the communist nations are prone to use all means at their disposal to exact a price for the return of US personnel.

(4) *Value as a Political Tool.* Communist countries value the prisoner most as a political or propaganda tool. The captor achieves success by employing the exploitation process so insidiously that a debilitated captive often does not realize what is happening. The process can take many forms, and may, at the time, appear ridiculous to the prisoner. He may be sure, however, that the procedure is calculated and that the captor has a specific use for the results of his effort.

d. *Pressure to Make Statements Favorable to Communist Cause:*

(1) One aspect of communist exploitation that has occurred in every experience US personnel have had with a communist captor is the eventual requirement for the prisoner to make statements either favorable to the communist view, or unfavorable to US interests. Attempts to acquire such statements have taken a number of forms. Coercion has been used to obtain oral statements for broadcasts or recordings for assemblies, or written statements for various printed media.

(2) In all cases examined, the persuasive techniques applied seemed to the prisoner at the time to be logical and valid. In large measure, this is the result of the captor's continuing effort to lead the prisoner to believe that he holds the power of life or death over him and his fellow prisoners. Since the prisoner sees little actual evidence to refute this contention, the position seems rational. However, the fact remains clear; the intrinsic value to the captor of holding the prisoner outweighs the temporary value of obtaining a propaganda statement.

(1) The restrictions on written communications imposed by DOD Directive 1300.7 and further delineated in Chapter 7 are designed to

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serve the best interests of the prisoner as well as the United States. In addition to safeguarding military information and denying the enemy a source of propaganda harmful to the US, these restrictions protect the prisoner against possible use of his written statements as evidence of alleged war crimes committed prior to capture. Nearly all communist countries have made a reservation to Article 85 of the GPW, under which they claim the right to deny PW treatment to persons convicted of war crimes. Under this reservation, once a prisoner is convicted of such crimes, he may be treated as a common criminal and deprived of all rights under the GPW, including appeal of the conviction to a higher court, confinement with other PWs, visitation by the ICRC and the Protecting Power, receipt of mail, and repatriation. Moreover, in cases where a prisoner convicted of a war crime is sentenced to death, the communists do not consider themselves bound to notify the Protecting Power that the death penalty has been imposed or to stay the execution of the sentence for six months after such notification, as required by the GPW.

(2) The Code of Conduct and DOD Directive 1300.7 specifically prohibit the making of "oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause."

The prisoner who categorically refuses to make oral or written statements not in the best interest of the United States is aiding his own cause.

(3) It has been the practice among communist captors to require PWs to include in their letters statements attesting to favorable treatment received by them as a condition precedent to the right of corresponding with the next of kin. Under these circumstances, the prisoner must insure that he does not include any statements in his correspondence derogatory to the US.

f. *Retaining Confidence in US Efforts in Behalf of Prisoners.* Realization that his country will continue its efforts to obtain his release and will provide for the support and care of his dependents gives the prisoner additional incentive to resist the enemy's exploitation efforts. The United States will negotiate through all available channels for the release of prisoners, and any statement by the captor that his country has written him off must be considered false and designed to increase the prisoner's apprehension and/or despair. To the prisoner, the conduct of negotiations might seem slow, but he may be sure that no program of the US Government carries a higher priority.

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